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Introduction 
Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, 
Soviet strategic interests in the three Scandinavian 
countries were limited.' One exception to this rule 
was the recurrent Soviet interest in the Baltic 
Straits,2 but this did not lead to any serious attempt 
to force a change in the existing rules for shipping 
through the Straits. The other exception was the 
Soviet fear - basically unfounded - that Sweden 
would join forces with Finland and the three Baltic 
states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) to create an anti-
Soviet "bloc" in the Baltic area.3 Despite this 
connection to the troubled relationship between the 
Soviet Union on the one hand and Finland and the 
three Baltic states on the other, Scandinavia was 
clearly peripheral to Soviet foreign policy and 
strategic interests. The Soviet Union's military 
buildup and foreign-policy priorities in Europe 
were aimed at creating a system of political 
guarantees for the country's borders on the Euro-
pean continent, backed up by steadily increasing 
ground and air forces. The Soviet state showed no 
inclination towards expanding into an area where it 
was politically and militarily incapable of playing a 
prominent role. 
During the 1920s and 1930s the Soviet Union 
gradually developed impressive land and air forces, 
but the restricted state of its navy left it with no 
other option than to accept the pre-eminence of 
Great Britain and Germany in Scandinavia. This 
was true for Norway and its possessions in the 
Arctic Ocean (Spitsbergen, Bear Island and Jan 
Mayen).4 Even on the eve of the Second World 
War, the Soviet Northern Fleet consisted mostly of 
coast defence vessels which were incapable of any 
ocean-going offensive operations and which were 
no match for Britain's Royal Navy or even the 
German Kriegsmarine. Denmark seemed to find 
itself squeezed between German land power and 
British naval power. Industrially and militarily 
Sweden was much stronger than its two Scandi-
navian neighbours, and less inclined to look to the 
great powers for security guarantees. From the 
Soviet point of view Sweden was of strategic 
significance mainly because of its assumed 
ambition to act as a regional great power in 
Scandinavia and the Baltic area. 
Up until 1939, Soviet policy in Scandinavia was 
defensive, aimed at using the limited Soviet 
leverage over the Scandinavian governments to 
impede real or imagined attempts by the other great 
powers to increase their own political and military 
predominance in Scandinavia. From the late 1920s 
on, Soviet propaganda focused on the issue of 
Scandinavian or Nordic cooperation, which up 
until 1934-35 was seen as a vehicle for British, and 
thereafter German, political and military 
penetration of the region. S At no point did the 
Soviets signal any ambitions of playing a military 
role on Scandinavian territories or in Scandinavian 
waters.' 
The Second World War, and not least Nazi 
Germany's use of Norwegian territory for attacks 
on the lines of communication between the Wes-
tern Allies and the ice-free ports in Northern 
Russia, brought an end to this state of relative 
innocence. The immensely enlarged scope of 
Soviet strategic interests and capabilities in Europe 
which grew out of the offensive movements of the 
Soviet armies from 1943 brought the Scandinavian 
countries closer to the centre of Soviet strategic 
interests. As the war in Europe drew to a close, the 
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Scandinavian countries became part of Soviet 
planning for the post-war order in Europe. The 
European upheaval also created the preconditions 
for strategically motivated initiatives which might 
entail a revision of the pre-war territorial and 
political order in Europe. 
Sweden had been spared the ravages of war and, 
when the fighting in Europe ended, presented itself 
as a haven of political and economic stability. The 
country had also built up a strong military defence 
during the war, with impressive naval and air 
forces. Sweden offered few opportunities, if any, 
for far-reaching Soviet foreign policy initiatives. 
Neither Soviet policy towards Sweden as it was 
actually implemented in the immediate post-war 
period, nor the documents hitherto made available 
in Soviet archives, hint at the existence of plans 
which would have affected Sweden's territorial 
integrity or its status as a non-aligned country with 
no foreign military bases on its soil. Apart from the 
idea, expressed in particular by Alexandra 
Kollontai, the Soviet envoy in Stockholm, that 
economic pressure might be used to secure for the 
Soviet Union a degree of "political influence" in 
Sweden, 7 there is no evidence that discussions of 
Soviet policy on Sweden in the early post-war 
years went beyond the defensive aim of resisting 
the further spread of what the Soviets perceived as 
the predominant Western influence there. 
Norway and Denmark, on the other hand, did not 
escape the attention of Soviet foreign policy and 
military strategists. Soviet soldiers took part in the 
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liberation of both countries, and the Soviet foreign 
policy bureaucracy was not averse to the idea of 
using the presence of Soviet troops to achieve 
long-term political and military goals in these 
countries. 
This paper will examine how the Soviets defined 
and partly pursued a set of strategic and political 
objectives in Norway and Denmark from 1944 to 
early 1947. These schemes ultimately failed, and in 
these years the ambitious ideas of the early post-
war period gradually gave way to the traditional 
and basically defensive policy of fmding ways of 
curtailing the rise of Western influence and control 
over these two Scandinavian countries. 
The focus of this paper is on the decision-making 
process within one of the bureaucratic structures: 
the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, renamed the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March 1946.'ln 
contrast to the .established image of effective and 
deliberate centralisation, the picture I will sketch is 
one of a foreign policy bureaucracy marked by 
imperfection and indecisiveness, where confusion 
and misinformation was part of the policy-making 
process.! will also argue that the Ministry to a high 
degree allowed its middle-level staff to generate 
and pursue their own proposals for foreign policy 
initiatives. Some of these officials apparently 
became strongly attached to their pet projects, and 
continued to argue that they should be 
implemented, even when confronted with a lack of 
interest, or even disapproval, on the part of the 
political leadership.' 
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Soviet strategic Interests In Denmark: 
the Baltic Straits and Bornholm10 
Soviet strategic interests in Denmark and Norway 
were linked to the need for secure lines of 
communication between Soviet home waters and 
the Atlantic Ocean - part of Russia's age-old quest 
for secure access to the high seas. Denmark 
attracted Soviet attention because of the country's 
key location at the entrances to the Baltic Sea. 
Denmark guarded the Belts (1be Great Belt and 
The Little Belt, in Danish territorial waters), which 
are, apart from the Kiel Canal, the only entrances 
to the Baltic Sea navigable by major warships. It 
shared the control over the shallow passage of the 
Sound (Oresund) with Sweden. Soviet strategic 
interests in Denmark also focused on the island of 
Bomholm, sitoated at the entrance to the narrow 
and westernmost part of the Baltic Sea." With 
regard to Norway, Soviet attention focused on the 
remote Bear Island and the Spitsbergen 
archipelago in the high north of the Arctic Ocean, 
and on the eastern part of Finnmark county in the 
extreme northeast of the Norwegian mainland. 
These factors induced Soviet foreign policy 
strategists to argue the need for Soviet military 
bases on Norwegian and Danish territory. They 
also led to demands for a revision of the rules 
governing the transit of warships through the Baltic 
Straits, and for abrogation of the 1920 Treaty on 
Spitsbergen, which defmes Svalbard as a 
demilitarised area under Norwegian sovereignty. 
Thus, the Soviets wanted to gain control over the 
entrances to the Baltic Sea and the sea lanes from 
the Atlantic Ocean to Northern Russia This 
complements their well-known attempts, starting in 
the spring of 1945, to gain command of the 
entrances to the Black Sea However, far stronger 
pressure was brought to bear on Turkey than 
anything ever applied to Norway or Denmark. 
A memorandum from October-November 1940 
defmed Soviet strategic interests in Denmark in the 
following simple tenns: 
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Denmark's strategic significance is defined by 
its role as a country which [has] the real 
control over the shipping through the Straits, 
which are an important link in the general 
strategic situation in the Baltic theatre of war. 
The power that controlled the Baltic Straits and the 
Kiel Canal could decide whether the Baltic should 
be an open or a closed sea. 12 
It seems reasonable to assume that this memoran-
dum was written in connection with Molotov's 
visit to Berlin in November of the same year. In his 
discussions with Hitler's foreign minister, Molotov 
brought up the Baltic Straits, suggesting some sort 
of internationalisation of the passages. Ribbentrop 
refused to enter into a discussion of this issue, 
reminding Molotov that "Gennany is at war with 
England, and therefore a number of questions 
cannot be solved now". Apparently, Molotov made 
no attempt to press the issue." After the Gennan 
attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, the issue 
of the Baltic Straits became part of the ensuing 
Soviet discussions about the post-war order in 
Europe. When Anthony Eden came to Moscow in 
December 1941, Stalin suggested that he would 
like "a guarantee by certain Powers as to the 
entrances to the Baltic Sea". Apart from the issue 
of the Straits, however, Stalin indicated that the 
Soviets felt no interest in Denmark proper, hinting 
that Great Britain might want to have military 
bases there after the war. The island ofBomholm 
was not mentioned in the discussions." 
The evidence from the years 1941-1944 is still 
limited and inconclusive concerning the position of 
Denmark in Soviet thinking about the post-war 
order in Europe. However, from the very 
beginning of the fonnalised Soviet planning 
process, the issue of the Baltic Straits figured on 
the list of topics to be studied. One of the bodies 
responsible for preparing the Soviet position for 
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the international negotiations which would follow 
after the end of the war, was the so-called 
"Commission for the preparation of diplomatic 
materials", often called simply the "Litvinov 
Commission" (Komissiia Litvinova). This 
commission, set up in early 1942 under Molotov's 
chairmanship, was in 1943 renamed the 
"Commission for the preparation for peace treaties 
and the post-war orders", and Litvinov was 
appointed its chairman. Although its direct 
influence on Soviet policy decisions is doubtful, 
the topics brought up by the commission and the 
arguments employed certainly reflected the 
attitudes of senior members of the foreign policy 
apparatus." 
In the spring of 1942, a memorandum on the Baltic 
Straits was prepared for the commission by Profes-
sor Vsevolod N. Durdenevskii, a specialist on 
internationallaw.16 It is unclear, however, whether 
this paper came up for discussion in the 
commission. When the reorganised commission 
met for the first time under Litvinov's 
chairmanship on 8 September 1943, the issue of 
the Baltic Straits still figured on the list of tupics to 
be discussed.17 However, it was not until 22 July 
1944 that a plenary session of the commission was 
convened tu discuss Soviet interests in the Baltic 
Straits and the western part of the Baltic Sea. The 
task, according to Litvinov, was to formulate a 
policy which could create maximum security for 
the Soviet Baltic coast. The Soviet Union would 
prefer to have the entrances to the Baltic Sea 
closed to warships of non-littoral states, and to 
internationalise the Straits and the Kiel Canal. 
Litvinov also held that the Aaland Islands ought to 
be brought under Soviet sovereignty. However, 
Litvinov was aware that the Soviet Union would 
hardly be able to achieve all this. In particular he 
was sceptical about the chances of achieving a 
straits regime which would close the Baltic Sea to 
the navies of the Western great powers." 
Deputy commissar Solomon A. Lozovskii argued 
that the Soviet Union would need military bases" 
on the island of Bomholm. This idea was not 
mentioned in the original report prepared for the 
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commission. The Soviet Union, according to 
Lozovskii, needed additional strongpoints in the 
Baltic Sea between the Kiel Canal and the Aaland 
Islands. Both Litvinov and Lozovskii realised that 
it might be difficult to produce a legal basis for the 
demand for military bases on Bomholm, "which 
belongs to Denmark, with which we are not at 
war". In the end, it was decided to accept the text 
of the memorandum which formed the basis for the 
discussion, with an addition about the possibility of 
Soviet military bases on the German island of 
RUgen.20 
A few weeks later, similar views were presented to 
deputy commissar V.G. Dekanozov by the head of 
the NKID's 5th European Department, Pavel D. 
Orlov." Orlov stressed the Soviet Union's 
"particular interests" in Denmark as the guardian 
of the entrances to the Baltic Sea. Interestingly, 
Orlov's memorandum was based on the 
assumption that the Soviet Union would take part 
in the military liberation of Denmark from the Nazi 
forces." Orlov's subordinate, Tatiana Zhdanova, 
was more explicit in her interpretation of Soviet 
aims in Denmark. She suggested that Poland (i.e. 
the Lublin committee) and France should be 
invited to sign an inter-allied declaration on 
Denmark. The idea of such a declaration, to be 
signed by the three major allies, had been brought 
up by the British. In Zhdanova's view, bringing in 
the Poles would strengthen the Soviet presence in 
the areas adjacent to the North and Baltic Seas, 
thereby creating a counterbalance to the "Anglo-
Americans" there. As part of this scheme, Polish 
troops (from Gen. Berling's army) might take part 
in the military operations in Denmark.21 As of 
December 1944, therefore, no decision had 
apparently been made on the question of whether, 
or in what way, Soviet forces should take part in 
the liberation of Denmark. On the eve of the 
planned Moscow visit of representatives of the 
Danish Freedom Council - a visit that never took 
place - Dekanozov added to Orlov's list of mate ri-
als to be prepared a memorandum "on the Danes' 
attitude towards an Anglo-American occupation of 
Denmark and to our participation in this matter". 24 
In their contacts with Thomas Dossing, the 
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Moscow representative of the Danish Freedom 
Council, Dekanozov, V.S. Semenov and other 
Soviet diplomats repeatedly emphasised that the 
Soviet Union was not disinterested in Danish 
affairs. In January 1945 Dekanozov hinted to 
Dessing that Denmark's liberation from Nazi 
occupation and the country's future political order 
(ustroistvo) were of interest not only to the Wes-
tern powers." 
Thus, there seemed to be a high degree of 
concordance of views in the Soviet foreign policy 
apparatus about the need to change the regime of 
the Baltic Straits. In the fina1 months of the war, 
the issue of security in the western part of the 
Baltic Sea was raised in several articles in Krasnyi 
flot, the navy commissariat's newspaper. Apart 
from analysing the significance of the Straits, the 
articles emphasised the significance of the islands 
of Bornholm and ROgen in controlling this portion 
of the Baltic.'" Then, in mid-March, the idea of 
seizing Bornholm was raised by Vladimir S. 
Semenov, Kollontai's deputy at the Soviet legation 
in Stockholm who in the years to cOme was to rise 
to prominence as a leading Soviet diplomat In a 
letter to Dekanozov Semenov wrote: 
In relation with the evolution of the military 
operations in Pomerania, it would be 
appropriate for the Supreme Naval Stqff to 
examine the possibility of landing our troops on 
the Danish island of Bornholm. Such an 
operation, if it is possible from the military 
point of view, would be absolutely justified 
politically, in view of the fact that the island is 
occupied by German troops and is used as a 
base against the USSR However, in this way 
participoting in the liberation of Danish 
territory and having control over the island 
(derzha v nashykh rukakb), we would acquire 
equal rights as the allies in the settling of all 
matters in Denmarlc, participating in the 
Control [. .. ] Commission, if such a body is to 
be created [' . .J. 
The English persuade Danish politicians, that 
Denmarlc, allegedly, is altogether within the 
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western powers' zone of operations and 
interests and that the Danish questions are of 
no concern or interest to the Soviet Union. 
However, the delimitation of the occupational 
zones in Germany and the English control over 
the Kiel Canal enhance Denmark's significance 
from the point of view of the security of our 
Baltic coast. 17 
It seems clear from the available elements of the 
ensuing correspondence that the issue had not been 
discussed between Molotov and Dekanozov, the 
deputy commissar primarily responsible for 
Scandinavian affairs. Dekanozov supported 
Semenov's proposal. On Molotov's instructions a 
copy of the letter was sent to N.A. Bulganin, the 
Deputy Commissar for Defence.28 
Unfortunately, the ensuing sequence of events is 
still unclear. According to a Soviet source, on 23 
April the navy commissar proposed captorlng 
ROgen and Bornholm to the General Staff. 
According to this source, the commander of the 
Baltic fleet received the fina1 order to prepare for 
the capture ofBornholm only on 4 May.'" On 7 
May the Soviets urged the German garrison to 
surrender. The same day Soviet aircraft bombed 
the island. When the Germans refused to capitulate 
to Soviet forces," Soviet aircraft repeated the 
bombing on 8 May. On 9 May a small force landed 
and received the German capitulation, and parts of 
a Soviet infantry division established themselves 
on Bornholm. 
According to the official Soviet version which the 
Soviets presented soon after their arrival, Born-
holm was seized simply because it lay to the east of 
the western limit of their zone of operations in 
Germany. Whatever may have motivated the 
Soviets to bomb and capture Bornholm, the local 
military commander was instructed to tell the 
Danes that the Soviet military presence was 
temporary and that the Soviet troops would be 
withdrawn when "military questions related to 
Germany" were fina1ly settled. This was done in 
order to dispel any anxiety the Danes might have 
had about what the Soviets intended to do with 
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Bornholm.31 Declarations to this effect were made 
during the meetings between the Soviet 
commanders and the official Danish 
representatives in the weeks immediately after the 
Soviets captured the island," and they were 
repeated in a Soviet note of24 July. 
Two memoranda from July 1945 presented the 
views of the NKID bureaucracy on Soviet policy 
towards Denmark. Mikhail S. Vetrov, the acting 
head of the NKID's 5th European Department, and 
his subordinate Tatiana Zhdanova, in a memoran-
dum to the deputy .commissars Andrei la. 
Vyshinskii and S.A. Lozovskii, reiterated that the 
Soviet Union should demand a regime for the 
Belts, the Sound and the Kiel Canal which would 
close the Baltic Sea to warships of non-littoral 
states." Vetrov and A.I. Plakhln, the newly 
appointed Soviet envoy in Denmark and former 
head of the NKID's Scandinavian Department, in a 
related memorandum repeated these 
recommendations for the Kiel Canal, but proposed 
a somewhat different solution concerning the 
Straits. A regime for the Straits, according to 
Vetrov and Plakhin, could be created by the 
signing of a Danish-Soviet treaty giving Soviet 
merchant and naval ships the right to pass through 
the Straits, while closing these passages to naval 
vessels of non-littoral states. Such a treaty should 
include the oblill!ition of the Soviet Union ''to 
assist Denmark in the upholding (sobliudenie) of 
the regime" established by the treaty. Other Baltic 
states should be invited to join the treaty." Finally, 
in a memorandum from December 1945 Litvinov 
repeated the by now well-known arguments and 
proposals, by recommending that the Soviet Union 
should try to achieve the internationalisation of the 
Belts, the Sound and the Kiel Canal. Only the 
Baltic states should participate in the control 
meaning the USSR, Poland, Sweden and Denmark. 
"After a certain period of time" Finland and 
Germany might be invited to take part in the 
scheme. However, any effective control of the 
Baltic entrances and the Kiel Canal would presup-
pose the creation of a system of military bases 
along these waterways." 
10 
Internal NKID deliberations also suggest that the 
final decision to surrender control of Bornholm to 
the Danish government was made only in the 
winter 1945-46. In their memorandum to Molotov 
of 10 July 1945, Vetrov .and Plakhin argued that 
Bornholm was "an iruportant strategic spot" 
located at the entrances to the Baltic Sea, and that 
it might "be an iruportant link in the safeguarding 
of our security" in the Baltic Sea. They referred to 
Danish and Swedish opinions that Bornholm might 
become ''the Malta of the Baltic Sea". However, 
the Soviet declarations made in May 1945 had 
serVed to reassure the Danes. Therefore, Vetrov 
and Plakhin argued, Soviet troops could remain on 
the island "for an extended period of time" 
(prodo1zhitelnoe vremia) without any risk of 
''political complications". They suggested reaching 
an agreement with the Danish government about 
the joint Soviet-Danish defence ofBornholm, with 
Soviet and Danish naval and air bases on the 
island. Such bases would serve two purposes. They 
would serve Soviet security interests in the region, 
but would also be important in securing Soviet 
"influence over Denmark's foreigu policy". 
Negotiations about military bases should be 
initiated before the Soviet troops were withdrawn -
in this situation the Danes could be expected to be 
more accommodating. The creation of naval and 
air bases on Bornholm should be complemented by 
the establishment of bases on RQgen." 
The idea of establishing permanent Soviet bases on 
Bornholm reappeared in intemaJ NKID documents 
throughout 1945. In December Litvinov suggested 
that hints of possible Soviet demands for military 
bases on Bornholm, and RQgen, could be used to 
make the Western powers more accommodating 
towards Soviet demands for the internationalisation 
of the Baltic entrances and the Kiel CanaI.31 The 
Soviet government's postponement of a planned 
visit to Moscow in September 1945 by a Danish 
government delegation apparently reflected the 
absence of a clear Soviet stance in the major issues 
of its policy towards Denmark: the Straits and 
Bornholm. The available Soviet documents give no 
direct answer to the reasons for this postponement. 
However, a letter from A.N. Abramov, newly 
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appointed head of the 5th European Deparbnent, 
and Vetrov of 9 October 1945 sheds some light on 
the Soviet reasoning. The Danish delegation, 
according to this letter, was supposed to discuss 
not only trade relations, but also "political issues, 
notably the evacuation of Soviet troops from the 
island of Bornholm" and repatriation questions. 
The "instantsiia" - the Politburo - had decided to 
defer the delegation's visit until the spring of 1946. 
However, the Danish government continued to 
urge the Soviet government to receive two of its 
representatives in Moscow. Abramov, Vetrovand 
Plakhin, the Soviet envoy in Copenhagen, 
supported this Danish proposal, partly because it 
would strengthen the "democratic forces" as 
opposed to the "reactionary" elements in Danish 
politics. However, the main reason behind 
Abramov's and Vetrov's support for the proposal 
was apparently to take the opportunity to bring up 
with the Danes, on a preliminary basis, 
the initiation of an agreement on the joint 
safeguarding (okhraruj) in the western part of 
the Baltic Sea (the creation of military bases on 
the island of Bornholm and the establishment of 
a regime for the straits}." 
The outcome is well-known: the Soviets decided 
not to present to the Danish government their 
demands for a revision of the regime over the 
Straits or for negotiations on the joint defence of 
Bornholm. Although the issue of passage through 
the Baltic Straits was brought up by Molotov and 
Stalin at the conference of ministers of foreign 
affairs in Moscow in December 1945, the Soviets 
made no attempt to press for a solution along the 
lines suggested in the numerous NKID memo-
randa. When Stalin expressed anxiety that the 
Soviet Union would be confined to the Baltic in the 
event of war, British foreign minister Ernest Bcvin 
declared that the British would oppose the 
establishment of bases in this area. Stalin said that 
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"he did not refer to bases at all", and that he only 
wished to raise the question of free passage 
through the Straits." The NKID's 5th European 
Deparbnent produced, however, a draft resolution 
stipulating that the establishment of a regime for 
the Baltic Straits should be the task of the Baltic 
states: the USSR, Poland, Denmark and Sweden." 
The draft, apparently, was not presented to the 
British and US representatives. 
The decision was taken to withdraw from the 
island. On 20 February 1946 the Danish envoy in 
Moscow, Thomas D"ssing, brought up in a 
conversation with Abramov the issue of the 
continued presence of Soviet troops on Bornholm. 
D"ssing declared that the Danish army, rebuilt. 
after the war, was now capable of taking over the 
task which had been the rationale for the presence 
of Allied troops in Denmark. The Soviet troops on 
Bornholm had carried out their tasks, and should 
now leave the island.4I A formal note to the same 
effect was delivered a week later." The next day, 
i.e. on 5 March, Molotov received the Danish 
envoy and delivered the following message: 
If Denmark is now capable of occupying 
Bornholm with its ownforces and of setting up 
on Bornholm its own administration without 
any participation whatsoever of foreign troops 
or foreign administrators, the Soviet govern-
ment will withdraw its troops from Bomholm 
and hand the island over to the Danish govern-
ment.43 
The fast response of the Soviet government 
suggests that the decision to leave Bornholm had 
been taken prior to the Danish demarche. The issue 
had also been discussed by Vyshinskii and the 
Danish foreign minister, Gustav Rasmussen, in 
early February." The Danish government agreed to 
the Soviet conditions in a message of 8 March, and 
the last Soviet troops left the island on 4 April 
1946.45 
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Soviet strategic interests In Norway: 
Svalbard and the northern borderlands 
The Soviets never tried to coerce the Danish 
government in to agreing to a revision of the 
regime of the Baltic Straits or a permanent Soviet 
military presence on Bomholm. Soviet-Norwegian 
relations evolved differently, however, and the 
internal deliberations of NKID bureaucrats resulted 
in a Soviet attempt to achieve the revision of the 
internationally recognised regime over the Sval-
bard archipelago. From November 1944, when 
Molotov introduced the matter during a 
conversation with Norwegian foreign minister 
Trygve Lie, and to February 1947, discussions of 
the international status of Svalbard were one of the 
formative elements in the Norwegian-Soviet 
relationship. Molotov demanded inter alia that 
Spitsbergen should be transformed into a Nor-
wegian-Soviet condominium, i.e. come under joint 
Soviet-Norwegian rule, and that Bear Island should 
be transferred to Soviet sovereignty. There is no 
need to repeat the story of the ensuing Norwegian-
Soviet negotiations: they have been discussed in 
detail by various authors.'" I will limit myself to a 
discussion of the origin and the evolution of the 
issue within the Soviet foreign policy apparatos. 
The idea of changing Svalbard's international 
status in favour of the SovietUnion had surfaced 
on the eve of the outbreak of war. Until then Soviet 
interests in the archipelago had been economic, not 
strategic. By 1939 and 1940, officials at the Soviet 
consulate in Barentsburg on Spitsbergen were 
arguing in favour of extending Soviet control over 
the archipelago, in order to prevent the British or 
the Germans from taking control. However, at that 
time their views did not seem to evoke much of a 
response in Moscow in terms of a profound re-
evaluation of Svalbard's significance - whether 
economic or strategic.47 
The German occupation of Norway in the spring of 
1940 gave substance to their warnings, and in the 
summer of that year the Commissariat for Foreign 
12 
Affairs' Scandinavian Department strongly 
supported the views of the Barentsburg group. In 
June and July NKID bureaucrats wrote several 
memoranda on Svalbard, stressing the area's 
strategic importance and providing proof that 
Norway's claims to the archipelago, and to Bear 
Island in particular, were weakly founded. The 
campaign culminated in early August when Pavel 
D. Orlov, the acting Head of the Scandinavian 
Department, recommended that the Svalbard 
archipelago should be occupied "by units of the 
Red Army" for the duration of the war and until 
the "period of complete stabilisation of internatio-
nal relations". In this he seconded strong appeals 
from the Soviet consul in Barentsburg, Petr 1. 
Volnukhin." 
However, the efforts of the Soviet consul in 
Barentsburg and of the employees of the Scandi-
navian Department failed to receive Molotov's 
support, although they were certainly brought to 
his attention. One reason for Molotov's lack of 
interest may have been that the Soviet military 
disagreed on the strategic importance of Spitsber-
gen and Bear Island. This, at least apparently, was 
the case in the summer of 1941, i.e. after the 
German attack on the Soviet Union. At the Soviet-
Norwegian-British negotiations in July and August 
that year, the Soviets made no strong efforts to 
obtain their allies' agreement to the initial Soviet 
idea of an Allied occupation of Spitsbergen, and at 
no point did they hint at the possibility of indepen-
dent Soviet action on Spitsbergen. Even the less 
ambitious idea of arming the Soviet population in 
Barentsburg evaporated. In the autumn of 1941 the 
Soviets took part in the evacuation of Norwegian 
and Russian civilians from Spitsbergen." At the 
beginning of the discussions Maiskii had declared 
to Anthony Eden that the Soviet government had 
"no territorial claims of any kind upon Norway, 
nor would they ever have them".'· 
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Thus, until Molotov's initiative in November 1944, 
the Soviets had made no attempts on the state-to-
state level to change Svalbard's international status 
in their favour. 
When Molotov fmally raised the topic with Lie in 
November 1944, this appears to have been a last-
minute decision, and the immediate background 
was a number of memoranda which argued the 
necessity of securing a stronger Soviet presence on 
Spitsbergen and Bear Island. The arguments were 
summarised by Deputy Commissar V1adimir 
Dekanozov in a memorandum which seems to have 
been given to Molotov only hours before his 
meeting with Trygve Lie. In his memorandum, 
Dekanozov emphasised the Soviet Union's 
economic interests on Spitsbergen, but also 
underlined "Bear Island's exceptional (iskliu-
chitelnoe) strategic importance both for the 
security of the Soviet mines on Spitsbergen, and in 
order to safeguard Soviet communications in the 
North". Dekanozov recommended that the Soviet 
government should immediately reestablish its 
legal rights on Spitsbergen, but also 
[ .. ] reach an agreement with the Norwegian 
government that the Soviet Union should have 
the right, if it deems it necessary, to organise 
one or more navy and air bases [ .. ] on the 
main Spitsbergen archipelago [ .. }. 
It would also be necessary to agree on 
the bUilding of a naval base on Bear Island in 
order to defend our rights on Spitsbergen and 
to safeguard the movements of Soviet ships of 
the Northern Fleet. SI 
Apart from the information contained in 
Dekanozov's memorandum, Molotov was not well 
acquainted with the topic. After Lie had objected to 
Molotov's argument that the Soviet Union had 
been "forced" to accept the Svaibard Treaty of 
1920 by pointing to the fact that in 1935 the Soviet 
Union had acceded to the Treaty entirely 
voluntarily, Molotov in a brusque manner asked 
his subordinates to explain what had compelled 
Litvinov to make this decision. 
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The ensuing Norwegian-Soviet negotiations 
culminated on 9 April 1945, when the Norwegian 
Ambassador in Moscow delivered to the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry the proposal for a Norwegian-
Soviet declaration. Article One of the draft 
declaration stated that "the defence of the 
Archipelago of Svalbard is the joint responsibility 
of Norway and the Soviet Union". From April 
1945 until Molotov raised the matter again in the 
summer of 1946, Moscow made no serious efforts 
to finalise a Soviet-Norwegian agreement on 
Svalbard. Molotov apparently felt that the Norwe-
gian government had agreed to his most important 
demand - Soviet military bases on the islands. 
The same group ofNKID officials who had been 
the driving force behind the Svalbard initiative 
presented and vigorously pursued a set of 
proposals aimed at securing a military foothold for 
the Soviet Union in Northern Norway. These 
proposals received much stronger support from the 
military leadership than the NKID bureaucrats' 
attempts to finalise the Svalbard negotiations. 
In October 1944 a middle-level official in the 
NKID's 5th European Department, Tatiana 
Zhdanova, presented a memorandum which linked 
the Svalbard issue to the futore of Northern Nor-
way. In her view, Spitsbergen constituted 
one side of the channel which connects the 
Atlantic Ocean with our arctic regions. This 
channel used to be a very broad one, but it has 
to a Significant degree been "squeezed" by the 
evolution of aviation. In this way, the question 
of reviewing our border with Norway is closely 
linked with the review leading to a decision on 
the Spitsbergen question. 
The fact that Petsamo (pechenga) was ceded to the 
Soviet Union from Finland did not, in Zhdanova's 
opinion, solve the problem of the "channel" to the 
Atlantic. Thus Zhdanova argued along the lines 
which had been introduced by the Soviet Consul in 
Barentsburg in 1939 and 1940, but introduced the 
development of modern aviation as an additional 
reason to alter the status quo in the High North. 
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Zhdanova concluded: 
Taking into account the foreign policy benefit 
which the Red Army's participotion in the 
liberation of Northern Norway has brought us, 
it would be appropriate to exploit the 
Norwegians' need for a counterweight, through 
friendship with the USSR, to the English 
anempts to achieve a ''portugalisation'' of 
Norway. In the course of the war England has 
gained almost complete control over Norway. 
Thus it appears that it would not be difficult for 
us to reach an agreement with the Norwegians 
on cooperation on the defence of Northern 
Norway; on the bUilding of navy and air bases, 
necessary railways etc. Otherwise the English 
will do this. The creation of this kind of close 
postwar SOViet-Norwegian cooperation, which 
would ensure for the Soviet Union appropriate 
permanent influence in Norway, would leave 
the possibility of raising the problem of a 
correction to the Soviet-Norwegian border at a 
more suitable moment. J2 
In the months following the Norwegian draft 
decIaration of9 April 1945, international conferences 
and pressing global issues apparently removed the 
Svalbard question, and NOIwegian affairs in general, 
from the Soviet decision-maker.;' main agenda 
However, while Molotov was concentrating on the 
more important European and global questions, his 
subordinates continued to press for a more offensive 
Soviet policy towards Norway. A group of officials 
in the Foreign Ministry's 5th European Department 
made repeated attempts to convince Molotov of the 
need to finalise the Svalbard discussions. They based 
their efforts on the Norwegian government's draft 
declaration of9 April 1945, i.e. on the idea of joint 
Soviet-Norwegian defence ofSpitsbergen. From 
early June 1945 onwards, the same officials also took 
various initiatives to revive Zhdanova's October 
1944 proposal for a permanent or semi-permanent 
Soviet military presence in the northern parts of 
mainland Norway. The key figure was MikhaiI 
Sergeievich Vetrov, acting head of the 
Commissariat's 5th European Department. 
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A letter of 4 June from Rear Admiral Stepan G. 
Kucherov, the Chief of the Navy Staff (Glavnyi 
morskoi shtab Voenno-Morskogo Flota), provided 
Vetrov with an opportunity to press for a more 
active Soviet policy. In his letter Kucherov 
expressed concern about the activity of the 
significant number of Germans who remained in 
Northern Norway, and about the Norwegian 
military authorities' subordination to the British. 
Kucherov proposed that the Soviet government 
should "create a special staff in Norway, which 
could then immediately start to work on the 
problems which have been accumulating there". 
This staff should include representatives from the 
Commissariat for Defence, from the Navy 
Commissariat, from the Commissariat for Foreign 
Affairs, and from General Golikov's Repatriation 
Commission which was already working in Nor-
way." It should be noted that Admiral Kucherov 
did not suggest that the Soviet Union, for strategic 
or other reasons, should expand its military 
presence in Northern Norway by establishing 
military bases or by expanding the area coutrolled 
by Soviet troops. 
Vetrov, when asked to comment on Kucherov's 
letter, reached his own far-reaching conclusions. 
Argning that the Norwegian-Soviet agreement of 
16 May 1944 on jurisdiction and administration in 
territories liberated by Allied troops "does not limit 
the areas which can be occupied by one or other of 
the Allied Powers", he supported Kucherov's plan 
to create a group of Soviet representatives in 
Norway. He also suggested, however, that the 
Soviet government should 
give instructions to the General Staff of the Red 
Army to immediately move troops of the 14th 
Independent Army which are stationed in 
Northern Norway into the north-western part of 
Norway, up to and including Narvik. S< 
On his own initiative Vetrov sent to Molotov a 
separate memorandum about Svalbard, suggesting 
that naval units should be sent to Spitsbergen to 
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"create garrisons" on the island. The aim should be 
to "final[y resolve the Spitsbergen question." 
When the Commissar for the Coal Industry, Vasilii 
V. Vakhrushev, suggested sending a group of 
specialists to Spitsbergen to prepare the reopening 
of the coal mines, Vetrov apparently felt that this 
much less ambitious plan contradicted his own 
intentions. Mo[otov, nevertheless, gave his 
approval to Vakhrushev's proposal, and Vetrov 
was instructed to take the necessary steps to 
implement the p[an." It seems that Mo[otov did not 
respond to Vetrov's initiative. Vetrov, ordered to 
implement a decision which might conflict with his 
own more ambitious scheme, made one further 
attempt to move the decision-makers in his 
direction. In a letter to Deputy Commissar So[o-
mon A. Lozovskii of 19 June, he emphasised that 
his initiative had been taken independently of 
Vakhrushev's letter, and that it had "political" 
rather than "economic" aims. Measures to secure 
Soviet economic interests should be employed ''to 
implement on Spitsbergen and Bear Is[and 
initiative,s of a political and military-strategic 
nature". Vetrov warned against separating the 
Soviet economic interests "from the question of 
creating a naval base on these islands and of 
establishing our garrisons", and concluded that 
implementation ofVakhrushev's plan should be 
postponed." 
Mo[otov's failure to respond did not discourage 
his subordinates from taking further initiatives. 
Vetrov and Zhdanova continued to pursue their 
pet projects: a solution to the Sva[bard question 
and the creation of Soviet bases in Northern 
Norway. One of their memoranda repeated 
(literally) Zhdanova's arguments from October 
[944, concluding that it would be easy to reach 
an agreement with the Norwegian government 
on the joint defence of Northern Norway and the, 
creation there of Soviet military bases, strategic 
railways, etc. Once permanently established in 
Norway, the Soviet government could raise the 
need to revise the Soviet-Norwegian border at 
an appropriate time." As for Svalbard, they 
argued that the agreement with Norway on joint 
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defence of the archipelago should be finalised 
and imp[emented." 
At this point, V etrovand his colleagues received 
welcome support from the General Staff on the 
matter of necessary changes to the Soviet-Norwe-
gian border. In a letter of 14 July [945 the Deputy 
Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General N. 
S[avin, argued ''the necessity (neoblrhodimost) of 
improving our strategic situation" in the Northern 
border region. If the aim was to secure the impor-
tant Soviet naval bases and ice-free ports on the 
Ko[a peninsula, the optimum solution would be to 
move the Soviet-Norwegian border to the river 
Tana and the Tana fjord - which would mean 
transferring the whole of the Varanger peninsula 
and the area south of the Varanger fjord (Varanger 
and Ssr-Varanger municipalities) to the Soviet 
Union. Together with the presence of the Soviet 
military on Bear Is[and, this would create the 
preconditions for the establishment of a "huge 
[and- and sea-based strategic defence area" 
(bolshaia sukhoputnaia i morskaia 
strategicheskaia zona prikrytiia), stretching from 
the Spitsbergen archipelago to the Ko[a peninsula. 
The minimal solution would be to [ease the Varan-
ger area from Norway for a term of25-50 years." 
When the Soviet Ambassador to Norway, Niko[ai 
D. Kuznetsov, sent Moscow an alarming report 
about Norwegian activity on Spitsbergen, Vetrov 
reminded Deputy Commissar Lozovskii of his 
earlier message to Mo[otov, to which he had not 
received any response, and argued that the Soviet 
Union should "immediate[y return to Spitsbergen", 
in order to establish military garrisons on the 
island. Mo[otov, however, was not prepared to 
make a decision on the joint declaration on Spits-
bergen or on the strategic elements of ilie various 
proposals which had been put forward by his 
subordinates. On 6 August Vetrov brought to 
Lozovskii's attention a list of ''unresolved 
questions" which needed Mo[otov's decision, 
among them Vetrov's earlier proposals for Spits-
bergen. Mo[otov apparently responded by giving 
his agreement to the Spitsbergen expedition 
proposed by Vakhrushevand the Commissariat for 
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the Coal Industry." The expedition, which 
according to available evidence was a purely 
civilian affair, left for Spitsbergen in mid-Septem-
ber 1945. 
Thus, as of July-August 1945 the bureaucmts in the 
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the Deputy 
Commissars dealing directly with Norway had 
produced a number of proposals aimed at a more 
active Soviet policy for Svalbard and Northern 
Norway. Parts of their efforts had received strong 
support from the Soviet military authorities, but 
had failed to kindle Molotov's enthusiasm. 
These ideas remained very much alive within the 
foreign policy bureaucmcy. Throughout 1945 and 
1946 the group of activist bureaucrats continued to 
press for a comprehensive solution involving both 
Northern Norway and Svalbard. However, there 
was a growing understanding within the foreign 
policy apparatus that Soviet proposals along the 
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lines urged by Vetrov and his colleagues would 
have repercussions far beyond the Soviet-Norwe-
gian relationship. Increasingly, Soviet policy 
towards Norway was becoming caught up in the 
evolution of East-West relations, and the Soviets 
gradually realised that their room for manoeuvre 
was strictly limited. The plans for changing the 
Soviet-Norwegian border were finally rejected in 
the winter of 1946, when Molotov issued orders to 
prepare the demarcation of the new Soviet-Nor-
wegian border according to the pre-war 
Norwegian-Finnish border. On the bilateral level 
the Svalbard issue was put to rest in February 
1947, when the Norwegian Storting rejected the 
idea of joint Norwegian-Soviet militarisation of the 
archipelago. Although there were proposals, inter 
alia from the Soviet Ambassador to Norway, to 
accept the Norwegian invitation to start general 
negotiations with a view to "improving" the 
Svalbard Treaty, Soviet policy towards Svalbard 
rapidly changed towards the defence of the status 
quo. 
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Conclusion: the bureaucratic formulation of policy 
proposals, and the limits to Soviet influence in 
Scandinavia 
The Svalbard initiative and the NKID bureaucrats' 
proposals for an expansionist policy towards 
Northern Norway illustrate the crucial role of the 
foreign policy bureaucracy in Soviet policy 
towards Norway in the early post-war period. 
Tatiana Zhdanova, a middle-level bureaucrat, 
produced proposals which would have had far-
reaching and grave consequences for the Soviet-
Norwegian relationship if they had been 
implemented. Although Zhdanova most probably 
wrote her memorandum of October 1944 on the 
order of or at least in full understanding with her 
immediate superior, Mikhai1 S. Vetrov, who was 
then acting Head of the 5th European Department, 
I have not been able to fmd any documentation to 
indicate that Zhdanova and Vetrov responded to 
signals from their superiors." There is evidence, 
however, that the ideas of Zhdanova and her 
colleagues in the NKID's 5th European 
Department were carefully stodied on the level of 
the deputy commissars, and were reflected in the 
policy proposals which reached Molotov and the 
other top decision-makers. 
The circumstances surrounding Molotov's meeting 
with Trygve Lie on 12 November 1944, and 
Molotov's behaviour during and after the meeting, 
leave the distinct impression that this was certainly 
not Molotov's own project. These ideas did not 
reflect a "grand strategy" on the top political level, 
and never received much attention from Molotov. 
However, the bureaucrats who conceived and 
elaborated the expansionist schemes had limited 
access to comprehensive information about the 
overall priorities of Soviet foreigu policy and the 
political realities in the foreign country in question, 
i.e. Norway. This can explain why Molotov did not 
react to the proposals from 1939 and 1940 to step 
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up Soviet control over or even occupy Spitsbergen: 
Molotov had no desire to armoy the Germans by an 
adventurist policy in the High North. This pattern 
repeated itself from 1944 onwards, when the 
expansionist ideas of the NKID bureaucrats 
conflicted with overall Soviet foreign policy 
priorities. The NKID bureaucrats were simply 
unable to realise the implications of their own 
projects. 
The Svalbard initialive and the plans for Northern 
Norway also illustrate what was in all likelihood a 
common phenomenon in the Soviet foreign policy-
making process: the weak coordination with other 
bureaucratic structores. Although the reasoning of 
the NKID diplomats and bureaucrats was replete 
with military-strategic terminology, it appears from 
the available documentation that the NKID 
bureaucrats did not seek the advice of the military 
authorities before the issue was brought up with 
the Norwegians. The General Staffwas asked to 
present its opinion about the strategic value of 
Spitsbergen and Bear Island only afterwards, and 
seems t6 have been unaware of the Soviet-Norwe-
gian discussions from November 1944 to April 
1945." It then turned out that the military leaders 
were much more interested in Northern Norway 
than the distant Svalbard area, with the possible 
exception of Bear Island. Vetrov' s attempt in the 
summer of 1945 to block Vakhrushev's plan of 
sending a civilian expedition to Spitsbergen, was 
yet another example of non-coordination of impor-
tant policy initiatives among bureaucratic 
structures. 
The absence of coordination between the military 
and foreign policy bureaucracies weakened the 
chances of Vetrov, Zhdanova and others of 
convincing the decision-makers of the need for a 
more forceful policy towards Svalbard. As for 
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Northern Norway, Molotov, as opposed to his 
subordioates, must have realised that a Soviet 
initiative along .the lioes proposed by Zhdanova, 
Vetrov, Dekanozov et al. would have repercussions 
far beyond the Soviet-Norwegian relationship. 
Even the fact that the General Staff supported the 
idea of a system of Soviet military bases io 
Northern Norway failed to convioce Molotov of 
the need to put aside the political considerations 
which kept him from raisiog the issue. 
The documentation of Soviet deliberations about 
the strategic significance of the Baltic Straits and 
Bornholm raises more questions than it answers." 
There was, apparently, unanimity withio the Soviet 
foreign policy bureaucracy about the need to revise 
the regime of the Baltic Straits, with the aim of 
closing the Baltic Sea to warships of non-littoral 
states. The idea of establishing permanent Soviet 
naval and air bases on the island of Bornholm 
meant an additional step io the direction of !rans-
formiog the Baltic Sea ioto a mare clausum. The 
circumstances of the Soviet landiog on Bornholm, 
seen io conjunction with the (admittedly meagre) 
evidence on the origio of the decision to send 
Soviet troops to the island, iodicate that this 
decision was primarily motivated by political, not 
military, considerations. 
However, Soviet policy towards the Baltic Straits 
and Bornholm does reveal the limits of Soviet power 
and influence io Denmark. Soviet strategic ioterests 
io the country were not sufficiently strong to warrant 
a policy which might prevent the reali7mion of more 
important Soviet objectives elsewhere io Europe, and 
have the uniotended effect of pushing a frightened 
Denmark even further ioto the orbit of the Western 
powers. The Soviets seemed caught io an iosoluble 
dilemma: the Soviet military presence on Bornholm 
was motivated by the desire to create a means of 
influenciog the Danish government Any hints of 
Soviet iotentions to use their troops io this role, 
however, would immediately compel the Danes to 
appeal to the Western powers for help and support 
Only the achievement of superior foreign policy or 
military-strategic aims could warrant the use of 
military leverage. 
Soviet ioterests io Denmark, as in Norway, were 
simply not of this magnitude. The potential threat 
ioherent in the Soviet military presence on Danish 
and Norwegian soil proved useless. In a letter to 
Molotov of February 1946, Plakhio, the Soviet 
envoy to Denmark, hinted that the contioued 
presence of Soviet troops on Bornholm provided 
the British and the Americans with an excuse to 
maintain a military presence io Denmark proper.64 
Similarly, the Soviets gradually realised that Soviet 
demands with regard to Spitsbergen provided the 
Americans with welcome arguments in support of 
their efforts to obtain permanent military bases on 
Greenland and Iceland. 
Therefore, the pursuit of Soviet strategic objectives 
in Denmark and Norway gradually gave way to the 
traditional and basically defensive policy of 
confiniog the Western great powers' influence in 
and control over these countri.es. Soviet diplomatic 
reports from Denmark and Norway in the early 
post-war years reveal a curious disparity between 
the dire description of the "Anglo-Saxons'" 
overwhelming iofluence and activity io these 
countries, and the less-than-impressive proposals 
for measures to remedy the situation. In February 
1947, for instance, Plakhin reported from 
Copenhagen that British and American post-war 
policy io Denmark aimed at ''transformiog Den-
mark ioto a bridgehead against us" and securing 
full control over the Danish straits. To underpin his 
argument, Plakhio presented examples of the 
feverish "Anglo-Saxon" activity io Denmark, in 
the political, military, economic and cultural fields. 
Although Plakhin was optimistic about exploiting 
"existiog conflicts of interests" between Denmark 
and the Western great powers, his specific 
suggestions for initiatives which would "increase 
our influence io Denmark" clearly reveal that the 
Soviet envoy realised that the Soviet Union had 
strictly limited chances of iofluencing Danish 
affairs. OfPlakhio's 15 recommendations for 
Soviet initiatives, 12 were io the field of "cultural 
contacts and propaganda", one was of a strictly 
formal nature (to give the legations the status of 
embassies), and the final two concerned trade 
relations. There are no hints that Plakhin at this 
point was considering direct active measures to 
counteract the US-British military presence in 
Denmark, by bringing up for instance the issue of 
the internationalisation of the Baltic Straits or a 
Soviet or joint Soviet-Danish fortification of 
Bomholm." The aim of Soviet policy in Denmark, 
according to Plakhin, should be to strengthen 
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Denmark's ability to resist the British-US 
influence, and to develop economic contacts 
between Denmark and the socialist countries." 
Similar reports came from Soviet diplomatic 
representatives in Oslo and Stockholm. These 
limited foreign policy aims were a far cry from the 
ambitious initiatives which had been discussed by 
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